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 Implementing revisionism : Assessing a revisionist theory of moral responsibility 
Frédéric‐Ismaël Banville∗ 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others 
in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel 
Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility-
specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates 
a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a 
naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the 
normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for 
thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual 
revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the 
“meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate 
revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations 
about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility 
and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.  
Thinking about responsibility (almost always) leads to the well-
trodden paths of the problem of free will and to the question of how 
it can be reconciled with determinism. Intuitively, knowing whether 
free will is compatible with determinism is of the utmost importance : 
if determinism is true and free will does not exist, then we cannot 
hold anyone (morally) responsible. Accordingly, theories of moral 
responsibility have been categorized on the basis of their take on that 
particular interrogation. Either determinism is true and we do not 
have free will (hard determinism) or, determinism is not true, or at 
______________ 
∗ L'auteur est étudiant à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université du Québec à 
Montréal). 
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least does not hold for us as humans (various strands of 
libertarianism) or, determinism is compatible with free will 
(compatibilism). 
Revisionist approaches differ from these traditional theories of 
responsibility and as Manuel Vargas1 argues, at least one particular 
species, moderate revisionism, is of particular interest. First, it is 
immune to (or at the very least, it is less vulnerable to) the usual 
criticisms levelled at these approaches (viz. the “familiar argument”, 
discussed in section 1.2), and, second, it has the virtue of bringing to 
the forefront concerns shared by most if not all theories of moral 
responsibility, viz. telling us how we should treat each other under 
the relevant circumstances. On this view, a theory of responsibility is 
primarily a practical theory. I will not go into much details here 
(section 1 will take care of that), but it is important to note that this 
focus on the practical aspect comes at a price. Traditionally, 
normative theories of responsibility are justified because they are 
anchored to a metaphysical property of responsibility : our concept of 
responsibility is appropriate because it refers to the right kind of 
thing. On an account of the type Vargas puts forward, not only is the 
traditional metaphysical question of the compatibility of determinism 
with responsibility (or free will) sidestepped, but the metaphysical 
nature of responsibility becomes partially irrelevant. Provided 
revisionism can effectively and justifiably limit the scope of the 
discussion to, for instance, the justification of various norms and 
practices, the question is about how we justify our responsibility 
practices, until such time as we decide metaphysical questions are to 
be addressed. 
The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory 
among others Vargas develops. Vargas advocates moderate 
revisionism, a type of approach which, when understood correctly, 
provides an alternative to the traditional theories about responsibility 
that purportedly preserves what is really important for theories of 
responsibility, while doing away with the pitfalls of the metaphysical 
debate about free will and determinism. However, while Vargas 
provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue 
that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not 
______________ 
1 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility”. 
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seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-
theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of 
moderate revisionism. To defend this point, a detailed outline of the 
particular type of revisionism Vargas endorses is necessary and will be 
provided in section 1. Section 2 will deal with Vargas’ positive 
proposal. Finally, I will show that there is a discrepancy between the 
level of independence the various components enjoy towards one 
another in the meta-theory and in the implemented version.  
1. What revisionism is, and what sort of a revisionist Vargas is 
In this first section I provide a comprehensive outline of what I 
call the “meta-theory” of revisionism as developed by Vargas. Making 
clear what moderate revisionism entails at the meta-theoretical level 
will make it possible to highlight the discrepancies between what 
revisionism should be, and what it is once we implement it. A caveat is 
in order though : I will be focusing on a specific type of revisionism, 
one that Vargas calls “moderate revisionism” because it is the sort of 
revisionism he explicitly endorses2. 
1.1. What is revisionism ? 
Broadly speaking, revisionism is the idea that some aspect of our 
responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and concepts are in 
need of revision3. To make this definition a bit clearer, let us take a 
look at what theories of responsibility are usually supposed to be 
doing, and what they are about. First, it is relatively uncontroversial to 
suppose that theories of responsibility typically have to answer three 
questions : the metaphysical question (about the nature of 
______________ 
2 This is because, in part, moderate revisionism is mostly immune to the 
“familiar argument” (see Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist’s Guide to 
Responsibility” for a detailed discussion of the “familiar argument”), which 
posits that any form of revision of our concept of responsibility necessarily 
entails the elimination of our responsibility-characteristic practices. This sort 
of argument is often directed at strong revisionism, because it tends towards 
eliminativism about our practices, concepts and attitudes. 
3 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 399. 
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responsibility, viz. what is responsibility), the descriptive question 
(about what our responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes and 
concepts are), and the normative question (about what those things 
ought to be)4. Moreover, a theory of responsibility typically has to work 
with three things : 1) psychological dispositions (roughly what 
Strawson5 calls reactive attitudes), 2) responsibility-characteristic 
practices (rewarding, for instance) and 3) our folk-concept of 
responsibility (cluster of beliefs and concepts we hold about 
responsibility)6. 
It is clear that the two last questions call for different projects, one 
descriptive, and the other normative7. What makes an approach 
revisionist is the fact it prescribes something else than what it 
diagnoses. This might seem, prima facie, to be strange, but think simply 
of Dennett’s particular brand of “compatibilism”8, especially in his 
1973 paper9. We might very well be completely determined (viz. 
mechanism10 is true), but we are still justified in viewing each other as 
morally responsible agents, because it is the only way we have to 
______________ 
4 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 402. 
5 Strawson, P. F. (1960), “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British 
Academy. 
6 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 402. 
7 Vargas (2005) uses diagnostic and prescriptive, probably to minimize the risk of 
confusing the normative aspect of a theory of responsibility with a theory of 
normative ethics. I use the terms interchangeably, unless otherwise noted. 
8 It is unclear whether Dennett is a compatibilist or a revisionist, and it 
surely is not an easy question to answer. Vargas (2005) proposes that the 
Dennett of Freedom Evolves (2003) can be read both ways and argues in 
favour of a revisionist reading, while McKenna (2009) considers Dennett a 
“multiple viewpoint compatibilist”, in reference to Dennett's reliance upon 
the intentional stance. Considering Dennett's account exhibits clear 
revisionist features, I will take for granted a revisionist reading, since even if it 
turns out he is a compatibilist, it seems safe to assert he would be a 
revisionist sort of compatibilist.  
9 Dennett, D. C. (1973), “Mechanism and Responsibility”. 
10 Here, mechanism refers to the idea that by virtue of our being part of a 
natural order that is determined by a set of laws and so on, human beings are 
just as much a predictable mechanism as is a plant, and we have no free will, 
no agency of the sort we intuitively think we would have (Dennett, D. C. 
(1973), “Mechanism and Responsibility”, p. 253).  
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interact with each other in the relevant contexts. This serves as a 
good illustration of what Vargas means when saying a revisionist 
theory is one where there is a divergence between normative and 
descriptive projects. This particular sort of revisionism is what Vargas 
calls “paradigmatic revisionism” (a revisionism which puts forward a 
separation between normative and prescriptive, as opposed to other 
forms of revisionism), which can be broken down into three types. 
The first of those is weak revisionism which is revisionism of our 
beliefs about some elements of a theory of responsibility. In short, 
weak revisionism asserts we need to revise our understanding of 
responsibility, but does not entail any sort of revision of the concept 
itself. Strong revisionism, on the other hand, entails the elimination 
of some or all of our concepts, attitudes, or practices, generally as a 
consequence of scepticism about responsibility itself (whatever it may 
be)11. Between those two positions lies moderate revisionism which is 
the type of revisionism Vargas endorses. 
1.2. Moderate revisionism 
Moderate revisionism is the idea that our folk concept of 
responsibility is inadequate until it has undergone some measure of 
revision. This is what Vargas calls moderate conceptual revisionism. 
If a theory identifies this sort of conceptual error, but maintains that 
the property of responsibility exists and does not need to be revised, 
then the theory is of the “error-success” type : there is a conceptual 
error but there is no property error. On the other hand, a theory 
could assert that the error extends to the property of responsibility, in 
which case it is of the “error-error” type. I will not discuss error-
success revisionism further, as it comes with a set of particularly 
complex problems, especially if one intends to preserve some form of 
indeterminist or libertarian account of responsibility12. Error-error 
revisionism, however, does come with its own set of constraints. 
______________ 
11 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 408-
409. 
12 The main problem for an error-success account is that it has to explain 
how it is that there is a property of responsibility but that we do not have the 
right concept to refer to it. On could devise a causal theory of reference, 
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Before moving on to the constraints of error-error revisionism, 
there is something to be said about how moderate revisionism evades 
the “familiar argument”, which in essence posits that any revision of 
our concept of responsibility or of the property of responsibility 
entails the elimination of our practices, attitudes and so on. Recall the 
distinction drawn in 1.1 between the different things a theory of 
responsibility is about : psychological dispositions, practices, and folk 
concept. Revisionism can be about any of those things while leaving 
two of them untouched, or eliminate one of those things, revise 
another and leave the third alone. Revisionism, thus, can vary 
between categories. Revisionism can also vary within categories. 
Conceptual revisionism, for instance, could simply be about the 
freedom condition of responsibility, while leaving other parts of the 
conceptual apparatus untouched, or it could revise only a small subset 
of our practices. This means, then, that moderate revisionism, even 
of the error-error type, is never committed to wholesale elimination, 
thus dodging the “familiar argument” bullet. However, error-error 
revisionism must comply with two very important constraints.  
The first constraint, which is applicable to any moderately 
revisionist theory, is the plausibility constraint. Revisionist theories 
gain some ground by being open to the possibility of a normative 
account that is different from the descriptive account, which enables 
a naturalistically plausible descriptive account of responsibility that 
does not jeopardize the normative part of the theory in the way 
determinism13 is traditionally thought to. However, the normative 
account has to be plausible : a theory of responsibility that prescribes 
something that is sociologically impossible or simply implausible in 
light of our generic scientific knowledge about ourselves and our 
                                                                                                 
perhaps, but the fact remains that, prima facie, attempting to preserve the 
property of responsibility, or stating that it is not in need of revision, 
imposes considerable demands on a theory, which might be more 
complicated to meet than if we simply state that the property of 
responsibility is not what we thought it was and needs to be revised (see 
Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 415-417).  
13 “Naturalistically plausible” is taken to entail, to some extent, the truth of a 
certain sort of determinism, in the sense that any naturalistically plausible 
descriptive account will take humans as part of nature and subject to the 
same causal laws as anything else in the set of things that exist in nature.  
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psychology is simply inadequate. In a sense, the descriptive account is 
constrained by naturalistic plausibility, and the normative account is 
constrained by the descriptive. 
The second constraint is the “warrant” constraint and is specific 
to error-error revisionism. Given that this type of revisionism holds 
that the property of responsibility itself needs to be revised (or 
eliminated), the error-error theorist is committed to two things. First, 
there is no metaphysical property of responsibility or such a property 
needs to be revised14. Second, if our practices and attitudes are to be 
preserved or if we want to get to a (normatively) justified prescriptive 
project, we need something to act as an anchoring point for whatever 
practices we deem worthy of being prescribed15. In other words, the 
warrant constraint states that if there is no property of responsibility, 
or if such a property is not what we thought it was, we need another 
property, X, such that if we use X as an anchoring point for our 
responsibility-characteristic practices, they will be well-justified16. 
The question of how we are to justify our practices is precisely the 
one which Vargas tries to answer with the proposal we analyze in the 
following section. By way of concluding remark for this section, it 
seems appropriate to emphasize that what has been discussed so far 
is the meta-theory of revisionism, a sort of general framework that 
outlines the structure of a certain type of revisionist theory. 
2. Beyond the framework : the justification of our practices 
A revisionist account of the sort Vargas advocates, because it 
seeks to ground our understanding of responsibility practices, 
attitudes and so on in a naturalistically plausible way, cannot rely on 
things like agential causation17. Such a theory has to provide a set of 
responsibility norms, the justification for these norms, as well as an 
______________ 
14 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 413-
441. 
15 Ibid., p. 413-441. 
16 Ibid., p. 413-441. 
17 Chisholm, R. (2007), “La liberté humaine et le moi”, p. 325-341. 
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account of the candidates to which those norms apply18. Our concern 
here is with a normative account of responsibility, which requires a 
plausible and warranted account of the justification of our practices, 
and so I will focus on this part of Vargas’ proposal, which relies on 
moral influence theory (hereafter MI), though I will mention the 
important aspects of the descriptive theory. 
2.1. Moral influence  
MI theory is part of the traditional consequentialist model of 
responsibility and asserts that our responsibility-characteristic 
attitudes and practices are justified because they influence, in a 
forward-looking way, agents to act in a socially desirable fashion19. 
This particular version, however, is beset by considerable problems 
(discussed in 2.2). Vargas’ aim is to salvage the insight at the core of 
MI : responsibility-characteristic practices derive part of their 
justification from the effect they have on the type of creatures we 
are20.  
To understand Vargas’ proposal, it is useful to start by breaking 
down a “complete” theory of moral responsibility in three distinct 
sub-theories. First, a theory of moral responsibility must provide an 
account of responsible agency that makes clear the type of agent to 
which responsibility norms apply)21. Second, such a theory needs an 
account of the justified responsibility norms themselves, which leads 
to the third component, an account of the justification of these 
norms22. This last component in turn calls for an account of the aim 
of the responsibility system, of what it is directed at23. On Vargas’ 
view, all that MI can provide is an account of the justification of 
______________ 
18 While this might seem to be a mostly descriptive concern, an account of 
responsible agency needs to include at least some normative components, 
especially when one must determine what sort of agent can be exempted 
from responsibility judgements and for what reasons.  
19 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 92. 
20 Ibid., p. 91. 
21 Ibid., p. 96. Vargas also provides such an account in “Building a Better 
Beast” (manuscript). 
22 Ibid., p. 96-97. 
23 Ibid., p. 97. 
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responsibility norms, and this is the core of his argument. Since the 
main problem of traditional MI is that it is seen both by proponents 
and critics as attempting to provide a complete theory of 
responsibility24, scaling down the scope of MI is the first step in 
making it workable as a justificatory strategy for our practices, though 
it is not sufficient. 
As well as reducing the scope of MI, one needs to refine the 
notion. Traditional MI is committed to two things : 1) praise and 
blame are forward-looking attempts to foster socially desirable action 
and 2) the justification for praise and blame is partly derived from 
their effects (this is what Vargas thinks we should preserve from 
MI)25. The problem here is that the first commitment leads to 
construing the central thesis of MI as follows : the effects of praise 
and blame are actually the effects of particular tokenings of praise and 
blame. Vargas suggests that a better way to conceive of the effects of 
those practices is to see them as arising at the level of general 
practices26 : the justification for praise and blame arises from the 
group-level effects of justified norms that come to be internalized by 
members of the community. 
This requires an account of the aim of the responsibility system, 
as mentioned above. On Vargas’ view, the reason why MI works as a 
justification for our practices is because the responsibility system’s 
aim is to foster a specific kind of agency, one that is sensitive to 
moral considerations27. This means that we need to provide an 
account of responsible agency. Interestingly, both the theory of the 
justification of responsibility norms and the account of the aim of the 
responsibility system make a certain type of account of moral agency 
more attractive, one which states that it is dependent upon the 
presence and normal performance of basic psychological mechanisms 
(beliefs, intentions, etc.) as well as responsiveness to moral 
considerations28. I will discuss this feature of Vargas’ account in detail 
______________ 
24 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 100. 
25 Ibid., p. 98. 
26 Ibid., p. 98. 
27 Ibid., p. 98. 
28 Ibid., p. 99. 
Frédéric‐Ismaël Banville 
 124 
in section 3. For now, however, we need to look at how those various 
elements come together. 
2.2. Making MI plausible 
The three main components of Vargas’ account of the 
justification of responsibility norms are as follows : the aim of the 
responsibility system is to foster a distinctive kind of agency, which is 
defined by various psychological parameters as well as by sensitivity 
to moral considerations and our practices are justified because, at the 
level of general practices, they favour the internalization of 
responsibility norms. If those three things are true, it is required (and 
this is a descriptive question) that agents be 1) influenceable in virtue 
of 2) being responsive to moral considerations29. The result is that 
our practices are justified when those practices, over time, aid 
responsible agents to act in ways governed by moral considerations30. 
I will explain how those components interact. 
Two things need to be clarified. First, a leftover from traditional 
MI is the idea that practices will be effective insofar as they exploit 
our psychology31. The contention is that praise encourages us to 
repeat a particular course of action, or to view a particular type of 
behaviour as positive, whereas blame does the opposite. Second, the 
fact the norms of responsibility are regularly enforced by the 
aggregation of numerous instances of praise and blame lead agents to 
internalize those norms has an important implication, viz. that if this 
process of internalization involves justified norms, it will result in an 
agent that tracks and responds to moral considerations and, 
moreover, that does not need to go through actual deliberation each 
time she poses an action32. 
This defuses the common concern towards consequentialist 
approaches that we either are unable to carry out the calculation 
(deliberation, in this case) underlying our decisions, or that we simply 
“don’t work that way”. This could be likened to the idea that most of 
______________ 
29 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 99. 
30 Ibid., p. 99. 
31 Ibid., p. 100. 
32 Ibid., p. 100. 
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our decisions are made on the basis of heuristics or rules of thumb33. 
An MI account could assert that because of the influence the general 
practices of praise and blame, we come to internalize the 
responsibility norms upon which those practices are based, and that 
this results in our decision-making mechanisms relying on reliable 
heuristics for deciding what to do in a given type of situation. This is 
consistent with the role the internalization of norms plays in Vargas’ 
account34. Note that this leaves open the possibility of akrasia : those 
norms can be overridden, an agent could internalize the wrong 
norms, or fail to properly internalize the justified norms35. 
One concern, however, is that this internalization process depends 
on complex psychological parameters which are to be taken into 
account in the descriptive aspect of the theory. As seen in 1.2, the 
normative project of a revisionist theory of responsibility is 
constrained by the descriptive account that accompanies it, which in 
turn is constrained by naturalistic plausibility. I will not discuss this 
further here but it is important to note that knowledge of our moral 
psychology becomes not only relevant but crucial if we commit to the 
justificatory strategy Vargas puts forward. Indeed, MI as a 
justification of our practices relies on our having the right kind of 
responsible agency. This is the beginning of a concern I will detail in 
section 3, though it also serves as an illustration of the importance of 
moral psychology for Vargas’ theory. 
______________ 
33 See for example: Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky. (1982), 
Judgements Under Uncertainty- Heuristics and Biases. 
34 The notion of reliable evolved modules could be part of the descriptive 
story here. For instance, we could have some form of functionally 
specialized module that relies on social clues to help us make decisions. This 
is speculative, but as an example, we could think of Kurzban, Tooby and 
Cosmides’ (2007) discussion of coalitional computation: the clues we use to 
determine if a given individual is part of our group or of another one are 
extremely flexible and are, presumably, socially determined. This could 
provide a basis for an account of the internalization process that gives rise to 
the sorts of heuristics mentioned earlier by explaining how socially acquired 
parameters make their way to psychological mechanisms which operate in a 
largely unconscious and automatic way.  
35 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 100. 
Frédéric‐Ismaël Banville 
 126 
On might wonder how we move from justifying responsibility 
norms as a whole to justifying tokens of praise or blame. The answer 
is simply that the general norms provide guidelines to think about 
various types of situations, and that in any given circumstances, an 
agent will be able to pragmatically assess whether her blame or praise 
is justified (or an observer will pragmatically decide if a witnessed 
tokening of praise or blame is justified). This is because the general 
norms inform us about cases of a certain type36. One might, of 
course, demand more than a “mere” pragmatic warrant, but this is 
not the kind of epistemic certainty we can hope for. As a parallel, 
think of the other-minds problem. How can I be certain that anyone 
else has a mind ? The (generally accepted) answer is that I cannot 
know with absolute certainty if anyone else has a mind ; all I can rely on 
are behavioural correlates of having a mind or of having a 
conscience37. The same is broadly true of moral judgements, and 
indeed if we think of everyday moral judgements, we do not rely on 
extremely demanding epistemic credentials of the type that would be 
required to be absolutely certain a particular instance of praise or 
blame is justified38. Moreover, given that we consider those norms 
justified precisely because they contribute to our having the relevant 
kind of agency (one that is sensitive to moral considerations), we 
seem to have good reason to believe that, at least in typical cases 
covered by the generic norms, our judgements will be justified39. I 
will discuss atypical cases in section 3.  
Two last points before we can sum up the MI theory of 
justification. First, it must be noted that this account is modular : when 
integrated with different theories of normative ethics, there will be a 
change in the type or content of the moral considerations to which 
we are supposed to be receptive, but the structure of the account of 
the justification of the norms will remain intact40. MI, on Vargas’ view, 
is an account of how the norms that prescribe right action are 
______________ 
36 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 105. 
37 See, among others: Harnad, S. (2003), “Can a Machine be Conscious ? 
How ?”, and Hyslop, A. (2009), “Other Minds”. 
38 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 105. 
39 Ibid., p. 106. 
40 Ibid., p. 108. 
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justified. Second, and this is related to the first point, such an account 
of the justification of responsibility norms is not normatively 
exclusive, viz. moral influence is not the only way our practices can be 
justified. In fact, there is a possibility for additional and potentially 
overlapping ways in which our practices as well as reactive attitudes 
can be justified41.  
2.3. Summing up 
Before moving on to the final section, it seems appropriate to sum 
up what has been said so far. The three components of Vargas’ 
account of the justification of responsibility norms are as follows :  
1) the aim of the responsibility system is to foster a distinctive kind of 
agency, 2) this moral agency is defined by various psychological 
parameters as well as by sensitivity to moral considerations, 3) our 
practices are justified because at the level of general practices they 
favour the internalization of responsibility norms. Section 2.2 
highlighted four characteristics of Vargas’ account that are required 
for his MI-inspired account of the justification of our practices to be 
workable. First, because Vargas endorses the second commitment of 
traditional MI, viz. that practices will be effective insofar as they 
exploit our psychology, the descriptive account of agency which 
accompanies the normative account of the justification of the norms 
must take into consideration the features of our moral psychology, in 
the sense that for the normative account to be plausible, we need to 
possess the right kind of agency. This kind of agency has to be 
receptive to moral considerations as well as enable the process of 
internalization to take place, since Vargas’ theory relies on the 
internalization of the responsibility-characteristic norms.  
Second, Vargas offers a provision for dealing with specific cases. 
Because we internalize the responsibility norms which underlie our 
practices, deciding whether a particular instance of praise or blame is 
justified is akin to using a sort of reliable heuristic when taking other 
sorts of decision. This leads Vargas to asserting that the best we can 
hope for in the way of epistemic warrant for our judgements is of a 
pragmatic nature. 
______________ 
41 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 108. 
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Third, Vargas makes it clear his account is modular, in the sense 
that the justificatory strategy he puts forward does not rely on a 
specific theory of normative ethics. If it turns out that 
consequentialism is true, then the norms we internalize will be of a 
consequentialist nature. If it turns out that deontologism is true, then 
those norms will be of that type. Regardless of what the moral 
considerations or norms are, the story about how they are justified 
remains the same. This ties in with the fourth feature, which is that 
the MI theory of justification is not normatively exclusive : there 
could be additional and overlapping normative accounts that also 
provide justification for our practices, and Vargas is clear on that 
point when he says that “the justification for praising and blaming 
practices derive, at least in part, from their effects on creatures like 
us.42” This means that MI is potentially not the only way in which our 
practices can be justified.  
At this point, we have a clear picture of how a revisionist theory 
of responsibility is structured and what it is committed to.  
3. Concerns, criticisms and perspectives 
This final section raises two concerns related to the discrepancy 
between the prescribed structure of a revisionist theory of 
responsibility, as outlined in the meta-theoretical account discussed in 
section 1, and the actual structure of the elements of an instantiated 
case of open revisionism about responsibility. 
3.1. Independence of the normative and descriptive 
The first concern I wish to address is internal to Vargas’ account 
and moderate revisionism in general. Recall that what makes 
revisionism attractive as a general approach to the problem of moral 
responsibility is that it allows that the different parts of a theory of 
responsibility be construed as relatively independent from one 
another. That is, by clearly separating the metaphysical question from 
the normative and descriptive questions (which are distinct), is 
becomes easier to identify what should really matter to any theory of 
______________ 
42 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 91. 
Emphasis added. 
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responsibility, viz. how we should treat each other in the relevant 
contexts. In his 2005 paper, Vargas makes a strong case for 
revisionism and indeed convincingly shows that a moderately 
revisionist approach can help us move beyond the traditional 
disagreements between compatibilists, determinists and libertarians. 
This is, however, at a meta-theoretical level. In what follows I will try 
to show that taking a closer look at an openly revisionist theory of the 
justification of our responsibility-characteristic practices highlights 
the fact that the independence of normative and descriptive accounts 
is not as clear as we might think. 
As shown in 1.2, the normative project of a revisionist theory of 
responsibility is constrained by the descriptive account that 
accompanies it, which is in turn constrained by naturalistic 
plausibility. This means that any normative account, including an 
account of the justification of our practices of praise and blame, is 
not receivable if it is in any way implausible given a descriptive 
account of, say, responsible agency. In the case of the justification of 
our responsibility practices, the normative account has two 
components : the justification of our practices and the account of the 
aim of the responsibility system, which is to foster a certain kind of 
agency in individuals. However, both the theory of the justification of 
responsibility norms and the account of the aim of the responsibility 
system make a certain type of moral agency more attractive, one in 
which responsible agency relies upon the presence and normal 
performance of a host of basic psychological mechanisms (beliefs, 
intentions, etc.) as well as responsiveness to moral considerations. 
Thus, the descriptive account, which informs us about the kind of 
agency we can have, becomes, in an important way, dependent upon 
the normative account. Of course, we could conceive of the 
relationship between normative and descriptive as follows : even 
though the descriptive account is suggested by the normative, the 
normative is still significantly constrained by the descriptive, because 
it depends on the descriptive being true.  
This answer is unsatisfactory, because the normative aspect 
imposes considerable demands on our moral psychology. For the 
normative account to hold, we not only need to have the right kind 
of agency, but we also need to have the psychological capabilities and 
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functioning required to make this kind of agency plausible. It is worth 
noting that such a reliance on moral psychology has an upside : if we 
manage to identify the psychological features required for the right 
kind of responsible agency, determining when a given agent is to be 
exempted from the demands of responsibility could become easier. 
This particular point is speculative, and I suspect even with a good 
understanding of moral psychology, such questions will not be so 
easily answered43. The point here is that the components of the 
revisionist account Vargas puts forward are not as independent as the 
meta-theoretical account suggests, and that it seems that the 
dependency and constraining relationship is not only from the 
descriptive to the normative but also from the normative to the 
descriptive. Whether this is a crippling problem is another question 
that I will not discuss here, but I believe what has been said so far 
warrants taking a closer look at how actual revisionist theories respect 
the parameters outlined by Vargas44. 
3.2. Typical and atypical cases 
The other question I wish to address is that of the pragmatic 
justification for particular instances of praise or blame. Recall that, on 
Vargas’ view, the best we can hope for is a pragmatically grounded 
justification that is derived from the general rules of thumb our 
responsibility system provides45. This works well for typical cases, but 
atypical cases may pose a problem. The problem is not so much that 
Vargas does not provide a solution to atypical cases (he does). Since 
we internalize a number of norms that guide our action, every 
singular case is judged on the basis of those norms, and if we are in 
the presence of an atypical case (whatever that may be), then we 
simply are not within the purview of the normative account Vargas 
provides, which is an account of the justification of our 
responsibility-specific practices in general. The problem (and it is not 
______________ 
43 For a detailed discussion of the difficulties posed by mental illness for 
theorizing on moral responsibility, see: Broome, M. R., L. Bortolotti, and M. 
Mameli. (2010), “Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study”. 
44 Vargas, M. (2005), “The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility”, p. 399-
429. 
45 Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility”, p. 105. 
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as much a problem as it is a concern), rather, comes from the fact this 
answer relies on the modularity of Vargas’ account : whatever we do 
with the atypical cases that require explicit deliberation will fall within 
the purview of whatever theory of normative ethics we adopt. This is 
of some concern because of the role moral considerations play in the 
general framework.  
For Vargas’ account to hold, we need to have a specific kind of 
agency, one that is responsive to moral considerations. Moreover, we 
use a theory of normative ethics to settle cases that are complex 
enough to demand something more than the application of a general 
rule that has been internalized and this theory provides the type and 
content of the moral considerations we are supposed to be sensitive 
to. The concern here is that it may be so that whatever the content of 
the moral considerations, the process of internalization will remain 
unchanged, but this is an empirical question to which moral 
psychology must provide an answer. Moreover, it is unclear what 
exactly those moral considerations are. I do not intend to alleviate 
this concern here, but an answer would probably have to show that 
the internalization process really does not depend on the content of 
moral considerations.  
This is, in reality, much the same worry as was expressed in 3.1. 
The possibility of developing independent normative and descriptive 
accounts makes revisionism attractive, and it is, with the sidestepping 
of the metaphysical question, what enables (moderate) revisionism to 
move beyond the traditional debates, at least at the meta-theoretical 
level. However, once we examine a substantive, openly revisionist 
account of the justification of our responsibility practices, it becomes 
clear that separating descriptive and normative accounts is not 
without problems, because, at least in the case of the theory examined 
here, the normative and descriptive are strongly interrelated and 
dependent on one another. I believe this highlights the main problem 
of revisionism as conceived by Vargas, which is that while it “looks 
good on paper”, once implemented it becomes clear that the 
demands we have for a theory of responsibility make the separation 
of the projects considerably more difficult than we might think at 
first. 
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This does not mean that revisionism should be abandoned. 
Revisionist approaches have been cropping up in the literature for 
quite some time and are continuing to do so. P. F. ‘‘Strawson’s 
Freedom and Resentment’’46, which defends the idea that our 
practices are justified because of our reactive attitudes (emotional 
reactions to a certain type of action) is one such example, and 
experimental philosophy47 has been doing promising work. Especially 
in recasting our “folk intuitions”, upon which so much of the work 
on responsibility and free will rely, in a more naturalistic framework, a 
project shared by the type of revisionism Vargas advocates. The 
increasingly naturalistic bent of some work on the question of 
responsibility promises to clarify many aspects of our moral 
psychology and thus help us build better descriptive accounts that 
will appropriately constrain and guide normative accounts. While I 
believe that such an influence of the descriptive on the normative is 
to some extent unavoidable, it seems it might raise the concern of the 
naturalistic fallacy, but as long as we keep this influence restricted to 
the plausibility constraint outlined in section 1.2, such a concern is 
unwarranted.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to assess whether an instantiated 
revisionist approach to moral responsibility48 really does track the 
meta-theoretical account Vargas develops in his 2005 paper. The 
motivation for this is that moderate revisionism, at the meta-
theoretical level, seems to provide a way to move beyond the 
traditional debates about responsibility and free will and to carve out 
an important place for naturalistic approaches and considerations. 
This is, to be sure, an attractive prospect, and hence the motivation 
for assessing whether an actual implementation of revisionism about 
______________ 
46 Strawson, P. F. (1960), “Freedom and Resentment”. 
47 See for instance Nichols who elaborates a naturalist defence of reactive 
attitudes: Nichols, S. (2007), “After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense 
of the Reactive Attitudes”. 
48 In this case the one developed in: Vargas, M. (2008), “Moral Influence, 
Moral Responsibility”. 
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moral responsibility does follow the same structure that lends 
revisionism its appeal. 
However, it seems that while Vargas puts forward a coherent and 
interesting theory of the justification of our responsibility-
characteristic practices, this account, which corresponds to (an aspect 
of) the normative project a theory of responsibility typically develops, 
it is far from being independent from the descriptive component. Of 
course, Vargas never says these two projects have to be completely 
independent of one another, but he is clear on the fact the normative 
is constrained by the descriptive, and it would be difficult to argue 
against such a relationship : whatever we propose, at the normative 
level, it has to be, at the very least, consistent with what we can 
achieve. The problem I have identified is that it is unclear in which 
direction the constraint goes. 
I do not believe, however, this is a crippling problem for 
revisionism. For one thing, what the normative account demands of 
the descriptive, at least in the case discussed here, is not, prima facie, 
completely implausible. The idea that we make responsibility 
judgements on the basis of internalized norms and that, in general, 
the responsibility practices are justified because they facilitate and 
promote the internalization of responsibility norms is plausible, 
though it really becomes an empirical question. Perhaps this is the 
main merit of revisionism. If we come to consider theories about 
responsibility as really being practical theories and that to determine 
whether a given theory of responsibility is adequate what we need is 
empirical evidence, the debates about responsibility could be usefully 
reframed. 
As an example of what I mean by this, note that the plausibility of 
Vargas’ account depends on empirical considerations about human 
cognition. In his 2008 paper, Vargas omits to consider adequate 
empirical support for his view. I have noted, however, that the 
internalization process he suggests, as well as the end result of that 
process (the internalization of general decision rules) is, at least at 
first glance, consistent with the heuristics and biases literature, 
especially with Gigerenzer and Todd’s work49. There remains some 
______________ 
49 Gigerenzer, G., P.M. Todd and ABC Research Group (eds.) (2000), Simple 
Heuristics that Make us Smart. 
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work to be done, especially if work about responsibility is to become 
more sensitive to empirical considerations. 
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